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Abstract
Macroeconomic models with heterogeneous agents and incomplete markets (e.g. Krusell and Smith,
1998) usually assume that consumers, rather than ￿rms, own and accumulate physical capital. This
assumption, while convenient, is without loss of generality only if the asset market is complete. When
￿nancial markets are incomplete, shareholders will in general disagree on the optimal level of investment to
be undertaken by the ￿rm. This paper derives conditions under which shareholders unanimity obtains in
equilibrium despite the incompleteness of the asset market. In the general equilibrium economy analyzed
here consumers face idiosyncratic labor income risk and trade ￿rms￿ shares in the stock market. A ￿rm￿s
shareholders decide how much of its earnings to invest in physical capital and how much to distribute
as dividends. The return on a ￿rm￿s capital investment is aﬀected by an aggregate productivity shock.
The paper contains two main results. First, if the production function exhibits constant returns to scale
and short-sales constraints are not binding, then in a competitive equilibrium a ￿rm￿s shareholders will
unanimously agree on the optimal level of investment. Thus, the allocation of resources in this economy
is the same as in an economy where consumers accumulate physical capital directly. Second, when
short-sales constraints are binding, instead, the unanimity result breaks down. In this case, constrained
shareholders prefer a higher level of investment than unconstrained ones.
Keywords: Investment, Incomplete Markets, Heterogeneous Agents, Unanimity, Short-Sale Con-
straints.
JEL classi￿cation: D52, D92, E22, G32.
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11 Introduction
In recent years macroeconomists have started exploring the implications of dynamic general equilibrium
models with heterogeneous agents, incomplete markets and aggregate shocks for a variety of issues, including
asset pricing (Krusell and Smith, 1997 and Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron, 2001), business cycles (Krusell
and Smith, 1998), and the distribution of income and wealth (Castaneda, Diaz-Gimenez and Rios-Rull,
1998). In these models consumers face idiosyncratic and aggregate uncertainty and accumulate assets, such
as physical capital, in order to smooth consumption over time. The assumption that consumers, rather than
￿rms, accumulate physical capital can either be interpreted literally, or alternatively, as capturing a situation
in which each consumer is also an entrepreneur. The latter directly operates a technology by employing his
privately accumulated physical capital and by hiring and supplying labor in a competitive labor market.1
This paper considers a version of the incomplete markets models cited above in which consumers trade
￿rms￿ shares rather than physical capital, and ￿rms￿ shareholders make decisions regarding investment in
physical capital. The incompleteness of the asset market implies that, in principle, this setting is not equiva-
lent to one in which consumers accumulate physical capital directly. When the asset market is incomplete, a
￿rm￿s shareholders do not necessarily agree on what the objective of the ￿rm should be, and, in particular, on
whether the ￿rm should maximize its stock market value or not (see e.g., Grossman and Hart, 1979). When
the asset market is complete, instead, marginal rates of substitution are equalized among shareholders, who,
therefore, unanimously agree on the investment decision of the ￿rm. In this context it is irrelevant whether
consumers or ￿rms accumulate physical capital.
This paper investigates the conditions under which the allocation of resources in the workhorse incomplete
markets model is the same independently of whether ￿rms or consumers are allowed to accumulate physical
capital. In doing so it makes three contributions.
First, using a two-period version of the standard incomplete markets model, it shows that if the ￿rms￿
production function exhibits constant returns to scale in capital and labor, and short-sales constraints are not
binding, then in a competitive equilibrium, any ￿rm￿s shareholders will unanimously agree on the optimal
level of investment. As a result, the equilibrium allocation of this economy coincides with the equilibrium
allocation of a similar economy in which consumers, rather than ￿rms, accumulate capital. Second, it shows
that when short-sales constraints are binding for some initial shareholders, the latter prefer a higher level
of investment than unconstrained ones. The paper discusses how this con￿ict among shareholders might be
1The equivalence of these two settings is guaranteed by the standard assumption of constant returns to scale in production
and the existence of an economy-wide labor market for labor. These assumptions guarantee that capital-labor ratios will be
equalized across production units, independently of whether ￿rms rent capital from consumers or the latter operate their own
technology. Angeletos and Calvet (2001) consider a version of this kind of model in which there is no economy-wide labor
market. Each entrepreneur employs his own capital and labor in the ￿rm, and, as a result, capital-labor ratios are not equalized
across ￿rms.
2resolved using majority voting. In this case, provided that constrained shareholders own a minority of the
￿rm￿s shares, the equilibrium stock price of the ￿rm is always equal to its capital stock and the allocation is
again the same as in the version of the economy in which consumers accumulate capital directly. Third, the
paper extends the unanimity result to a multiperiod economy.
Our companion paper (Carceles-Poveda and Coen-Pirani, 2004) provides a diﬀerent, though complemen-
tary, approach to the problem of the ￿rm￿s investment under incomplete markets. In the latter we also
compare a setting where ￿rms maximize period-by-period pro￿ts (i.e. the standard setting) with a setting
where ￿rms make intertemporal investment decisions and households hold their stock. However, instead of
directly addressing the question of unanimity among shareholders, we show that there exists a particular
objective for the dynamic ￿rm that implies the same equilibrium allocation as in the standard setting. This
objective corresponds to discounting the cash ￿ows of the ￿rm with any present value price that does not
allow for arbitrage opportunities. Diﬀerently from the present paper, this result is valid even if portfolio
restrictions are binding.
While the macroeconomic literature with incomplete markets has mostly assumed away the problem of
joint ownership of the ￿rm, this problem has received plenty of attention in the theory literature, starting
from Diamond￿s (1967) classic paper. The economies considered in the latter literature bear some similarity
with the one usually considered by macroeconomists, with some important diﬀerences.
First, the theory literature generally consider models in which capital is the only input in production
and the production function exhibits decreasing returns to scale (see, e.g., Magill and Quinzii, 1996, page
378). Macroeconomists, instead, typically assume constant returns to scale production technologies that use
as inputs capital and labor. The assumption of constant returns to scale is crucial for the unanimity result
of this paper.
Second, in the theory literature, borrowing or short-sale constraints are generally assumed not to be bind-
ing for shareholders.2 Binding borrowing constraints, instead, play a more central role in the macroeconomic
literature (see e.g. Krusell and Smith, 1998), so it is important to investigate their eﬀect on the investment
decision of the ￿rm. This paper shows that the unanimity result derived here breaks down when short-sales
constraints are binding, and that in this situation constrained shareholders would like the ￿rm to purchase
more capital than unconstrained ones.
Last, the theory literature typically considers two-period models, while the macroeconomic literature
considers in￿nite horizon economies. It turns out that the main intuitions of this paper can be presented in
a two period setting. The two-period model also makes it easier to relate the results of this paper with the
2This is one of the crucial assumptions made by Grossman and Hart (1979, page 299, footnote 5), for example. With binding
short-sale constraints, their approach to the problem of the ￿rm￿s objectives under incomplete markets based on ￿competitive
price perceptions￿ would not be applicable.
3classic contributions of Diamond (1967), Grossman and Hart (1979), and Ekern and Wilson (1974). This is
done in section 3.3. The generalization to multiperiod and in￿nite horizon economies is introduced in the
last section of the paper.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces a standard two-period model economy
with incomplete markets and idiosyncratic risk. Section 3 studies the equilibrium of this economy under the
assumption that consumers￿ borrowing constraints are not binding. Section 4 considers the case of binding
borrowing constraints. Section 5 analyzes the multiperiod case. Section 6 summarizes the results.
2 Model Economy
In this section we introduce the model economy. Since all relevant intuition can be obtained in a two-period
version of the benchmark incomplete markets model used in macroeconomics (see Ayiagari, 1994 and Krusell
and Smith, 1998), we will start from this case.3
L e tt i m eb ed e n o t e db yt =0 ,1. The economy is populated by a continuum of measure 1 of consumers,
indexed by i ∈ I =[ 0 ,1], and a continuum of measure one of ￿rms indexed by j ∈ J =[ 0 ,1].
Firms produce an homogeneous good that can be either consumed or invested. Each ￿rm operates the
production function y = F (k,l;z), where k denotes the physical capital input, l the labor input, and z is
a random variable. The production function F is assumed to be twice diﬀerentiable with respect to k and
l and display constant returns to scale: F (￿k,￿l;z)=￿F (k,l;z), for all ￿>0. The constant returns to
scale assumption will play a key role in the analysis.
The economy is characterized by both aggregate and individual uncertainty. The former is captured by
the random variable z, that is common to all ￿rms. At time zero the value of z is known and equal to z0. In




Let s0 = {z0} and s1 = {z0,z 1} denote the length-0 and length-1 histories of aggregate shocks, and πz (st)
the unconditional probability of history st, with πz
¡
s0¢
=1 . Also, denote by S1 the set Z ￿ Z.
The initial capital level of each ￿rm at time zero is denoted by k
j
0. This is exogenously given to each
















after the realization of
the shock z1.
Individual uncertainty refers to the fact that a consumer￿s labor endowment at t = 1 is random. At t =0
a consumer i is endowed with xi
0 units of labor, where xi
0 is non-random and can diﬀer across consumers.
3In Section 5, I extend the model to the multiperiod case.






A consumer￿s labor endowment at time 1, denoted by xi
1, is random and can take values in the set X =
'
x1,x 2,...,x L“











denote the histories of endowment shocks for consumer
i. The individual shocks might be correlated with the aggregate one, so that the probability of history si1
might depend on s1. Denoting by πx
¡
si1|s1¢









indicate the joint probability of si1 and s1. We assume that the only aggregate source of uncertainty is the
productivity shock z1. Individual uncertainty is assumed to disappear in the aggregate due to a law of large
numbers. In particular, the aggregate units of labor available for production at time 1 following aggregate

















Each consumer i is endowed with the following utility function:



















where c0 denotes consumption at time zero and c1 consumption at time one. The momentary utility function
U is assumed to be twice diﬀerentiable with U0 > 0a n dU00 < 0.
The consumer also derives income from trading shares of the ￿rms. At time zero a consumer i is endowed
with θ
i






, then the stock market opens, and consumers can rebalance their portfolios by buying or










denote the ￿nal shares of ￿rm j
held by consumer i after trading in the stock market. We assume that there is an exogenously given negative







where θ > 0.










. A consumer faces





































































denote the time 0 and time 1 wages per unit of labor endowment.













di =1 , for all j ∈ J. (5)
3 Equilibrium
The key diﬃculty in solving this model is represented by the fact that each ￿rm is, in general, owned by many
consumers-shareholders, and the latter might disagree on its optimal level of investment. Here we assume
that initial, rather than ￿nal, shareholders make the investment decision.5 Given this timing, a ￿rm￿s initial
shareholder has to form an expectation on how the ￿rm￿s stock price is going to change with diﬀerent levels
of investment.
The theoretical literature concerning the objectives of the ￿rm under incomplete markets has mostly
proceeded under the assumption of competitive price perceptions (from now on CPP), originally introduced
by Grossman and Hart in their seminal 1979 paper (see Magill and Quinzii, 1996 for a discussion of this
approach). With CPP each shareholder forms expectations about the eﬀects of investment on the ￿rm￿s
stock price using his own state prices. As a result, initial shareholders will unanimously agree to maximize
the ￿rm￿s net value p0 + d0, while potentially disagreeing on the best way to achieve this result. In turn,
this con￿ict can be either resolved by allowing transfers among shareholders, as suggested by Grossman and
Hart (1979) or by some voting procedure (see e.g. DeMarzo, 1993). One problem with the CPP approach is
that it is only applicable when there are no binding restrictions on short-sales of a ￿rm￿s stock.6 Moreover,
the CPP approach implies that in an incomplete markets equilibrium shareholders have diﬀerent opinions
5The results of this section easily apply to the situation in which ￿nal shareholders make the investment choice. The
assumption that initial shareholders make the investment decision implies that the latter have to form expectations about
the eﬀect of investment on the ￿rm￿s stock price. This would be always the case, independently of whether initial or ￿nal
shareholders decide on investment, in a model with more than two periods.
6See Grossman and Hart (1979, page 299, footnote 5) for a discussion of this point. In case an initial shareholder faces
binding short-sale restrictions, his state prices do not contain suﬃcient information on the change in the ￿rm￿s stock market
price following a change in its investment.
6about the sensitivity of stock prices to the level of investment.7 In this paper, instead, we adopt the standard
rational expectations assumption to derive shareholders￿ expectations on the eﬀects of diﬀerent investment
levels on the ￿rm￿s stock price. Among other things, this assumption implies that shareholders will always
agree on the eﬀect of a change in investment on the ￿rm￿s stock price, while possibly disagreeing on the
optimal level of investment to be undertaken by the ￿rm.
In what follows, the plan is to ￿rst de￿ne an exchange equilibrium for the economy described above by
taking the production and investment plans of each ￿rm as given. This exchange equilibrium determines
the relationship between ￿rm j￿s stock price p
j
0 and its capital stock in period 1, k
j
1, for given capital chosen
by the other ￿rms in the economy. The rational expectations approach to solving the investment decision
problem of a ￿rm consists of deriving the sensitivity of a ￿rm￿s stock price to variations in k
j
1 from this
relationship, rather than from the agent￿s individual state prices. Given this pricing function we can then
turn to the issue of determining the optimal investment level for ￿rm j. It turns out that in this economy,
under constant returns to scale in production, the set of unconstrained initial shareholders of ￿rm j will
















































































Before de￿ning an exchange equilibrium for this economy, it is important to point out that the assumption




























































To see why this is the case, it is convenient to consider a ￿rm￿s labor demand. Since this is a static
choice, its shareholders will always agree about hiring labor up to the point where its marginal product is
7See section 3.3 for further discussion on the CPP approach.
8Final shareholders will agree as well, but they are not the ones that are assumed to make the investment decision.


































Therefore, since under constant returns to scale FL (k,l;z) is homogeneous of degree zero in k and l,a l l



















where g is a function of w1
¡
s1¢
and z1 only. Replacing this expression into (7) and using again the constant





yields equation (8). An important implication of this equation











any two ￿r m si np e r i o d1a r ea l w a y sl i n e a r l yd e p e n d e n t .
An exchange equilibrium for this economy is de￿ned as follows.
De￿nition (Exchange Equilibrium). Given the dividends ((d
j
t (st))t=0,1)j∈J paid by ￿rms and the ini-
tial distribution of shares ((θ
i































)j∈J are optimal for consumer i ∈ I, i.e., they






)j∈J is such that the market for the shares of each ￿rm clears, i.e., (5) holds.
A key property of an exchange equilibrium of this economy is summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 1. In an exchange equilibrium, the rates of return on the stocks of all ￿rms are equalized for



















for all j,j0, and s1. (12)
To see this, suppose that there existed a couple of ￿rms j and j0 and a state of the world z1 such that



































8so that the equality condition is in fact violated for all possible histories s1. Thus, equation (13) implies
that the rate of return on ￿rm j￿s stock is always higher than the rate of return on ￿rm j0￿s stock, for all
possible realizations of z1. Then, clearly, there would be an incentive for a consumer holding ￿rm j0￿s stock
to sell it and buy instead ￿rm j￿s stock. This in turn would imply that the economy is not at an exchange
equilibrium. Therefore, equation (12) must hold.
This condition is important because it provides us with a way to compute the eﬀects of a variation in
























for all j0. (14)





, ￿rm j￿s shareholders take as given the stock price and the investment decision
made by all other ￿rms. Thus, equation (14) provides them with information about the eﬀect of diﬀerent



















for all j0. (15)











), as in equation (8). The period 1 dividends
paid out by ￿rms characterized by diﬀerent levels of capital would not be linearly dependent, and thus it
would not be possible to infer the eﬀect of variations in a ￿rm￿s investment on its stock price from the stock
prices of other ￿rms.
We conclude this section by stating the ￿rst order conditionassociatedwith a consumer￿soptimal portfolio








































> −θ. Notice that, because of equation (12),
if condition (16) holds with equality for ￿rm j,t h e ni tm u s th o l dw i t he q u a l i t yf o ra l lo t h e r￿rms j0 6= j.
In what follows we will separately consider the case in which the constraint (2) is never binding for any
agent from the case in which there is a positive measure of agents for which it is binding. The distinction is
important because in the former case all initial shareholders of a ￿rm will unanimously agree on the amount of
9capital to be invested. In the latter case, instead, there will be disagreement among initial shareholders, and
it will be necessary to specify a mechanism to aggregate these heterogeneous preferences into one investment
decision.
3.2 A Firm￿s Investment Decision When Short-Sales Constraints are Not Bind-
ing
In this section we consider the case where the short-sales constraint (2) is never binding for any agent i.9
Under this assumption let￿s now turn to the decision problem faced by a ￿rm in this economy. A ￿rm in
this model makes three decisions. It chooses the labor input at time 0 and at time 1 in each aggregate state
of the world. It also chooses a level of physical capital k
j
1(s0) to be used as an input in production in period
1. The capital stock depreciates at the rate δ after production.
The static nature of the labor input decision and its timing imply that all shareholders will agree on
the optimal quantity of labor to hire in a given period. The dynamic nature of the investment decision in
this incomplete markets setting, instead, suggests that there might be scope for disagreement among initial
shareholders on the optimal level of investment. The main result of this section is that, under constant returns
to scale in production and no binding short-sales constraints, there will be unanimity among shareholders.
Consider the investment decision of ￿rm j. Investment is assumed to be ￿nanced entirely out of the






maximize the utility function V i subject to (6) and (7), taking as given the price of labor and the investment































































Equation (18) is the key to understanding the eﬀect of incomplete markets on shareholders￿ investment
9Suﬃcient conditions for this to be the case are: i) θ = 0; ii) the minimum possible labor endowment realization in period
1 is zero, i.e., x1 = 0; iii) the marginal utility of consumption at zero is in￿nite, i.e. U0 (0) = +∞. These assumptions imply








=0a n dt h a t
equation (16) holds as an inequality. Then, equation (12) would imply that the ￿rst order condition (16) holds as an inequality




=0f o ra l lj ∈ J. In this case, since x1 =0 , a consumer will experience zero consumption
with positive probability. The assumption that U0 (0) = +∞ is suﬃcient to rule this case out. Thus, the short-sale constraint
will never bind.
10It is straightforward to add bonds to this economy without altering the unanimity result of the paper. As long as all initial
shareholders are unconstrained in their portfolio choice, the Modigliani-Miller theorem holds in this setup and the ￿nancial
structure of the ￿rm is indeterminate.
11By assumption, agents for whom θi
0j < 0 do not participate in the investment decision of the ￿rm. Their goal would be to
minimize rather than maximize the ￿rm￿s value.
10decisions. As initial owners of the ￿rm, shareholders care about the way investment in physical capital aﬀects
the net stock market value of the ￿rm. This eﬀect is captured by the term multiplying θ
i
0j in (18). As ￿nal
owners of the ￿rm, shareholders care about the way the ￿rm￿s investment aﬀects what Magill and Quinzii
(1996, page 380) refer to as the ￿spanning services of the ￿rm￿s equity contract￿: its stock price in period 0










are equalized among shareholders.
Thus, the second term in (18) is always zero.12
When the asset market is incomplete, instead, state prices are not necessarily equal among shareholders.
In this circumstance, the assumption of constant returns to scale in production guarantees that trading in
the stock market is suﬃcient to make shareholders agree on the expected discounted value of an extra unit


















































































 =0 . (20)





is equal to zero because stock market trading
equalizes ￿nal shareholders￿ valuations of future dividends, i.e. equation (16) holds with equality. This
observation leads us to the following proposition:
Proposition 2. The unconstrained initial shareholders of a ￿rm j will unanimously agree in setting its level





















denotes the price at time zero of a security that pays one unit of consumption in state s1 a n dz e r oi na l lo t h e r























This condition implies that the second term in (18) is equal to zero for all shareholders, independently of whether the production
function displays constant returns to scale or not.










w h e r et h ed e r i v a t i v eo nt h el e f th a n ds i d eo ft h i se q u a t i o ni sd e ￿n e di ne q u a t i o n( 1 9 ) .

















independently of their initial capital stock k
j





depends only on the
cost of investment, which is equal to one, and the present discounted value of period 1 dividends, which is
independent of a ￿rm￿s initial capital.
A competitive production-exchange equilibrium for this economy is therefore de￿ned as follows:
Production-Exchange Equilibrium. A production-exchange equilibrium for this economy is represented
by a stock price p0
¡
s0¢
), capital stock k1
¡
s0¢
, labor demands ((l
j
t (st))t=0,1)j∈J, wages (wt (st))t=0,1,























)t=0,1)i∈I constitute an exchange equilibrium for given
dividends (dt (st))t=0,1.







iii) The labor market clears: if wages (wt (st))t=0,1 are given by (9) and (10), aggregate labor demand
equals aggregate labor supply in t =0 ,1.
iv) Dividends (dt (st))t=0,1 are given by equations (6) and (7).
As a corollary to Proposition 2, we have the following result:
Corollary 1. Unanimity among initial shareholders implies that the equilibrium allocation of consumption
and capital in this incomplete markets economy is the same as in an economy where consumers, instead
of ￿rms, accumulate physical capital directly.
To show this point formally, consider a version of the economy where consumers, instead of ￿rms, accu-



















































12where rt (st) is the rental rate of the stock of capital owned by consumer i in period t. Letting aggregate





















































It is easy to see that the equations that characterize the equilibrium of this economy are the same as the
conditions that characterize a production-exchange equilibrium. First, the ￿rst order condition (23) is the
















. Second, the budget constraints (21) and (22) are equivalent to the ones in the economy



























3.3 Discussion and Relationship with the Literature
The key assumptions for the unanimity result obtained above are that the production function F displays
constant returns to scale and that short-sales constraints are not binding. These assumptions jointly guar-





in equation (18) is equal to zero: 1) The constant
returns to scale assumption guarantees that the latter term can be written as in equation (20); 2) The fact
that the portfolio decision is interior guarantees that the ￿rst order condition for agent i￿s portfolio choice
can be used to set this term to zero.
It is easy to show that this unanimity result is robust to extending the model to consider: 1) preferences
13I am abstracting from the ￿rm sub-index j here because in a production-exchange equilibrium there is symmetry across all
￿rms.
13characterized by non-expected utility; 2) preference heterogeneity among consumers; 3) diﬀerent ￿opinions￿
among consumers about the likelihood of a given state of the world; 4) adjustment costs in the installation
of new capital, as long as the adjustment cost function is homogeneous of degree one in current capital and
investment (as in Hayashi, 1982).14
In what follows we discuss how the unanimity result obtained here relates to some of the main contri-
butions to the theoretical literature on the objectives of the ￿rm under incomplete markets. Consider, ￿rst,
Diamond (1967)￿s classic paper. Diamond focused his attention on the case where: 1) uncertainty faced
by ￿rms takes a multiplicative form; 2) capital is the only input used in production; 3) production occurs
under decreasing returns to scale according to a production function of the form zG(k), where G0 > 0a n d
G00 < 0; and 4) capital fully depreciates within a period, i.e., δ = 1. Under these assumptions a ￿rm￿s period










). Given that aggregate uncertainty aﬀects dividends multiplicatively, an
argument analogous to the one developed in section 3.1 implies the equalization of ex-post rates of return












































Replacing (24) and the interior version of the ￿rst order condition (16) in (18) yields the equation that



























. Now, consider the relationship
between this result and the one obtained in the previous section. To do this, consider a possible extension of
Diamond￿s result to an economy where production occurs using capital and labor while assumptions 1) and
3)-4) are preserved. Denote the production function by zG(k,l), where G does not need to exhibit constant






























times a term that depends only on
aggregate variables.




























where h and e q are two functions. If this were the case then we could apply Diamond￿s argument summarized
above. The problem with this argument is that, even if uncertainty enters multiplicative in the original
production function, there is no guarantee that the decomposition (26) applies. Consider for example the










































which clearly does not take the form (26).15 In summary, in the model considered here, Diamond￿s as-
sumption of multiplicative uncertainty does not, in general, give rise to unanimity among shareholders if the
production function exhibits decreasing returns to scale in capital and labor. The assumption of constant
returns to scale in production, instead, is suﬃcient to obtain unanimity.16 Of course, as the example of
footnote (15) indicates, the assumption of constant returns to scale in production is not necessary in order
to obtain the unanimity result.
It is interesting to contrast the approach taken here in solving the model, with the one pursued by
Grossman and Hart in their seminal (1979) paper. They do not assume that F is constant returns to scale.




































15Notice, however, that when the production function takes the commonly used Cobb-Douglas form this problem does not



















z1 (1 − σ),
which satis￿es (26).
16Notice that if the production function displays constant returns to scale, the aggregate shock z must aﬀect this function
multiplicatively.
15where the subindex i on the left-hand side indicates that the perception of this derivative varies across
shareholders. This amounts to setting the second term in equation (18) equal to zero by assumption.T h u s ,
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i
=1 ,





. Grossman and Hart resolve this con￿ict by allowing for
income transfers among a ￿rm j￿s initial shareholders at time zero. In their approach, an optimal investment
plan for the ￿rm is such that there is no other investment plan and set of income transfers among shareholders
such that all shareholders are better oﬀ.











they still agree on the magnitude of this derivative. This is because trading in the stock market and constant
returns to scale in production guarantee that the right-hand side of equation (27) is the same among all
shareholders. An advantage of not postulating CPP is that we can extend our approach to the case where
short-sales constraints are binding (see section 4). In this case the CPP approach is not applicable because
t h er i g h t - h a n ds i d eo f( 2 7 )d o e sn o tm e a s u r et h em a r g i n a lb e n e ￿t of higher investment by the ￿rm for a
constrained shareholder.
The unanimity result obtained here can also be interpreted as a special case of the ￿spanning￿ result
derived by Ekern and Wilson (1974). They showed that if the asset market is incomplete shareholders will be
unanimous in approving investment plans generating vectors of dividends that are spanned by the payoﬀso f





























every s1.D i ﬀerent levels of a ￿rm￿s investment do not alter the spanning properties of its dividends vector.
Thus, the eﬀects of diﬀerent levels of investment on a ￿rm￿s stock price can be inferred from the information
c o n t a i n e di no t h e r￿rms￿ stock prices. Notice that the reason why Ekern and Wilson￿s spanning condition
holds here is non-trivial, in the sense that it is not an assumption, but rather an implication of constant
returns to scale in production. The key to spanning lies in the fact that from the point of view of period
0, the production function in period 1 eﬀectively displays constant returns to scale in physical capital only.
This is because the labor input in period 1 is chosen after the capital stock is already in place, and, by
constant returns to scale, the optimal labor input in period 1 is a linear function of capital (see equation 11).
164 Binding Short-Sales Constraints
In this section we analyze the case where the short-sales constraint (2) binds for some initial shareholders





in equation (18) is
not equal to zero. Except for the case in which the binding short-sales constraint is θ=0 , in which case
the second term in (18) disappears, this situation introduces the possibility of disagreement among initial
shareholders about the optimal size of investment to be undertaken by the ￿rm.
Consider an initial shareholder i for whom the short-sales constraint (2) binds. As noticed above, if
this constraint binds for one ￿rm j, then it must also bind for all ￿rms. The introduction of a short-sale

































, for all j ∈ J.
Replacing this into the ￿rst order condition for the shareholder i￿s preferred investment level (equation





































Proposition 4. Constrained initial shareholders of ￿rm j prefer a higher level of period 1 capital than















































is smaller than one, i.e., for each dollar of additional investment in the ￿rm, the ￿rm￿s
stock market price increases by less than a dollar. Despite the fact that the increase in the ￿rm￿s price is
smaller than the cost of increasing the ￿rm￿s capital, a constrained shareholder bene￿ts from this choice. In
fact, the higher stock price translates into greater proceedings from short-selling the ￿rm￿s stock. Given that
the shareholder is constrained, each extra dollar obtained from short-selling can be consumed today, while






17Notice that while the investment level preferred by constrained shareholders in equation (28) depends





, unconstrained shareholders agree among themselves on the level of
investment to be undertaken by the ￿rm. This property suggests that, as long as unconstrained shareholders
initially hold more than ￿fty percent of the ￿rm￿s shares, their preferred level of investment would prevail if
the latter was determined by majority voting. In this case, the price of one share of ￿rm j coincides with
the price of a unit of physical capital. Thus, as in section 3.2, the equilibrium allocation of this economy
would be the same as in an economy where consumers, rather than ￿rms, accumulate capital.
When initial constrained shareholders own more than ￿fty percent of the ￿rm￿s shares the analysis
becomes more complex. In a majority voting equilibrium, provided it exists, period 1 capital stock tends










, as preferred by constrained shareholders. While
interesting, this case seems unlikely to occur in the class of incomplete markets models analyzed in the
macroeconomic literature. In the latter, in fact the measure of constrained agents is usually negligible and
their share of the aggregate capital stock (the equivalent of the initial shares θ
i
0j in an economy where
consumers accumulate capital) even smaller.
5 Extension to Multiple Periods
In this section we show how the unanimity result derived in section 3.2 extends to a multiperiod, possibly
in￿nite horizon, economy. The additional feature of the model in this context is the fact that stock returns
depend not only on future dividends but also on future stock prices.
Consider ￿rst the case where T is ￿nite. Denote by sit the length-t history of individual shocks for agent



















denotes the probability, as of time zero, of histories
¡
sit,s t¢
. As a consumer, agent i faces



































































































and the notation st+1|st denotes the length-t +1h i s t o r yst+1 that follows history st.


































































Thus, period T − 1i se x a c t l yt h es a m ea sp e r i o d0i nt h et w o - p e r i o de c o n o m yo fs e c t i o n3 . I n i t i a l
































































where the second equality follows from the constant returns to scale assumption. At the beginning of period





in order to maximize his utility function.
17This assumption rules out disagreement among constrained and unconstrained initial shareholders. Initial shareholders
that are constrained in the stock market choose to hold zero shares of the ￿rm, and therefore only care about maximizing its
net stock market value.
18Notice that some initial shareholders will be unconstrained, while others will be constrained. However, assumption (29)
ruling out short-sales, implies that also constrained shareholder will want to maximize the net market value of the ￿rm. This




=0i nt h e￿rst order condition of a constrained shareholder (the equivalent
of equation 18).

















































































































on the net stock market value of





on the expected discounted value, as perceived by agent i, of the ￿rm￿s dividend and stock value at T − 1.





on the expected market value of the ￿rm at T −1
and dividends at T.W h i l e t h e ￿rst two terms are familiar from the analysis of section 3.2, the last one
is new. In a setting with more than two periods, in fact, a shareholder has to consider the eﬀect of his
investment choice on all the future values of the ￿rm￿s stock and dividends. In this case, the time T − 2
shareholder has to consider the eﬀect of his choices not only on time T − 1 variables, but also on time T
variables.
Using the arguments already developed above, it is possible to simplify equation (34) considerably. First,



























































































































































for all j,j0,s T−2,s T−1.





































































. All initial shareholders of ￿rm j in period T − 2 will unanimously agree to
set the level of capital to be used in production in T −1 equal to the stock price of the ￿rm in T −2. Using
the same logic, this unanimity result can be generalized to any period t<Tuntil the initial period t =0 .
It follows that:
Proposition 5. In the multiperiod economy with no short-sales of stocks, all initial shareholders of a ￿rm
j agree in each period t<Tto set its capital stock in t +1 , denoted by k
j









When T →∞there is no ￿nal period that can be used as a starting point for the backward induction
type of argument illustrated above. The de￿nition of dividends and the assumption of constant returns to
























where the lack of a terminal point prevents us from directly replacing p
j
t (st) instead of k
j
t+1 (st)o nt h el e f t
hand side of this equation (as in equation 33). The analysis in this case must proceed by ￿rst guessing




t+1(st), and then verifying that this guess is valid. Showing that the guess is valid
amounts to showing that there is unanimity among initial shareholders regarding the investment decision of
every ￿rm. The latter point can be proved exactly as above for the ￿nite horizon economy.
6 Summary
In this paper we have studied versions of the standard incomplete markets economy introduced by Aiyagari
(1994) and Krusell and Smith (1998) under the assumption that ￿rms, rather than consumers, accumulate
physical capital. If borrowing constraints are not binding and production occurs under constant returns to
scale, the equilibrium allocation of this economy is shown to coincide with the one that characterizes the
standard model. In particular, a ￿rm￿s shareholders will unanimously agree on the ￿rm￿s optimal level of
investment.
In the case in which borrowing constraints are binding, instead, the unanimity result breaks down.
Constrained initial shareholders would like the ￿rm to invest more than unconstrained ones. Given that in a
typical macroeconomic model with incomplete market (Krusell and Smith, 1998), the measure of agents for
whom short-sale constraints are binding is negligible, it is unlikely that taking this disagreement explicitly
into account would have a signi￿cant eﬀect on its quantitative properties. Therefore, taken as a whole,
this paper suggests that, in practice, there might not be any signi￿cant loss of generality in focusing on
incomplete markets models a la Aiyagari-Krusell-Smith where consumers, rather than ￿rms, undertake the
capital accumulation decision.
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